In Book 8 and Book 9 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he explores the relationship between rationality, passions, and moral virtue to define what is good in human character and action. For Aristotle, what makes an action good is that it is chosen according to the mean—a balance that reflects rationality and avoids excess or deficiency. Passions are not inherently good or bad. However, passions must be rational in which they are expressed in the “right amount” and directed at the “right thing.” Emotions like love, fear, and desire are not good on their own; they are good only to the extent that they align with reason.

Aristotle examines love and friendship in the context of virtue and happiness. Love is only good when it is rational (properly measured and directed). Parental love is rational even though it is intense because it is rooted in the “right amount” of care for children as their own. Aristotle further questions whether forms of love like unconditional love can be good. He believes that love must remain rational to be virtuous. Passions, including love, should ideally be ruled by reason.
Friendship (philia) is essential to Aristotle’s vision of a good life, and he categorizes friendship into three types: friendships based on pleasure, utility, and virtue. The first two—pleasure and utility—are incidental. They arise from what a person provides, not who they are. For example, a friendship based on pleasure might look like two people who enjoy playing video games together. They meet regularly to play, have fun, and share laughs during the game, but their connection is limited to this activity. If one of them loses interest in video games or moves to a different hobby, the friendship would likely fade because it was tied to the enjoyment they found in that shared experience.
A friendship based on utility is like our current relationship between two college students who walk together to class. They both benefit from the boredom of walking to class alone and having company during the commute. However, their connection is primarily superficial. If one of them changes course schedule or moves to another dorm, the friendship might dissolve because the original utility that brought them together no longer exists.
However, true friendship is based on virtue where two people love each other for their character and goodness. In this highest form of friendship, individuals value one another for who they are and are independent of any benefit they might receive. Such friendships are mutual, reciprocated, and recognized as valuable for their own sake. Imagine two people who admire each other’s character, share similar values, and support one another in becoming better individuals. They may encourage each other in personal growth, celebrate each other’s achievements, and provide emotional support in difficult times. They do this not because they seek pleasure or utility, but because they genuinely value and love one another for who they are. Aristotle argues that this kind of friendship is the highest form and is essential to living a good and meaningful life.
Aristotle also links moral virtue and friendship to happiness. Moral virtue is the rationality within our passions, and it leads to happiness because it reflects reason in our character. Friendship contributes to happiness because it allows us to contemplate the virtue of others. He believes that true friendship is contemplative—it enables the friends to really reflect on the rationality and goodness in another person.
Aristotle suggests that virtuous individuals can be friends with themselves because self-love is also based on admiration for virtue like true friendship. A bad person however, cannot have this relationship with themselves. Their passions are disordered and not aligned with reason. Our true “self” is our rational self, and self-love for virtuous people becomes an act of contemplation—reflecting on their own reason and moral goodness.
However, I would argue against Aristotle’s claim that a bad person cannot love themselves. While their self-love may not be grounded in virtue, it can still exist in a different form. A bad person might love themselves based on pride, self-delusion, or even a distorted view of their own worth. This kind of self-love is not rational or virtuous, but it is still self-love. People often justify their actions in a flawed way and can still find ways to admire themselves despite lacking virtue. Serial killers who are super flawed still love themselves in doing the killing. In this sense, self-love can exist even in the absence of rationality or moral virtue—it is just not the kind of self-love that leads to true happiness or fulfillment.





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