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In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle talks about the nature of friendship and even further categorizes it into three types of friendships: the friendships of utility, the friendships of pleasure, and the friendships of virtue. He views the friendship of virtue as the most genuine and enduring form. He considers the friendships of utility and the pleasure to be “incidental” or inauthentic and fake. In this paper, I will explain Aristotle’s categorization of friendship (what each type of friendships mean), analyze why he views incidental friendships as inferior (including a definition of what incidental means), and argue that his conception of virtuous friendship is flawed because it prioritizes a person’s moral virtue over the individual person themself which thereby also undermines the essence of true virtuous friendship. 

Aristotle explores the idea of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics. He sees friendship as a very fundamental aspect of human life and as a key component of eudaimonia (or human flourishing). Aristotle regards friendship (philia) as an indispensable aspect to a good (fulfilling and virtuous) life. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he states that “No one would choose to live without friends, even if he had all other goods” (Book VIII, p. 115). According to his view, friendship is both a source of pleasure and an essential element of a good life. Aristotle then classifies friendships into three main types: those based on utility, those based on pleasure, and those rooted in virtue. 

Aristotle first defines all the three friendships and what they mean to him. According to him, the first type of friendship (friendships of utility) are based on mutual benefit of the friends. This means that the two people that become friends do so because of the utility (benefits) they get from this relationship. This relationship is very pragmatic and often too transactional. The main focus is not on the friendship or of the other person but of the benefits this relationship can bring. An example of this type of friendship is those between business partners who would collaborate in a relationship to achieve shared goals and make profit. Once the benefit ceases and the deal is closed, the friendship-like relationship will also come to an end. 

Aristotle then defines the second type of friendship: the friendship of pleasure. According to him, this type of friendship arises from the enjoyment one person finds in the other’s company. Two people become friends only because by being friends, they can receive pleasure from this relationship. They do not see the other’s virtue or character and merely what pleasure they can personally benefit from in this type of relationship. An example of this type of friendship is the relationship shared by young people engaged in recreational activities like going to clubs or other events that bring them joy. They are friends just because doing these types of events are lonely by themselves and need to have people together to have more fun. In the end, they are just friends for the shared enjoyment and nothing else. These relationships are often also very fleeting and lasts only as long as the source of pleasure remains. 

The last type of friendship that Aristotle categorizes is the friendship of virtue. He believes that this type of friendship is grounded in a mutual admiration for each other’s moral character (virtue) and a shared commitment to living a good life (virtuously). There are three main characteristics of a virtuous friendship to make it a real friendship of virtue. First, there has to be goodwill or genuinely wishing well for the other person in the relationship. Second, the two friends have to love the other person for their own sake and not for any personal benefit such as pleasure and utility. They love each other simply for who they are (or what their moral virtue is). Thirdly, this type of love (friendship) has to be reciprocated and recognized by the other where this mutual affection is acknowledged and returned by both parties. If the relationship is only one sided, then it is also not a virtuous friendship. If a relationship satisfied all three factors, then it is considered to be a friendship of virtue.

Compared to the friendship of virtue, Aristotle argues that friendships of utility and pleasure are mere”incidental” friendships. First, to understand his claim, we need to understand what Aristotle means by “incidental.” After understanding its definition, his word choice will further highlight the superficial nature of these relationships. 

According to Aristotle, an “incidental” friendship is “not really friendship at all” because they are artificial and inauthentic. These relationships are only called “friendship” because of their resemblance to virtuous and real friendships but are actually not even considered friendships. The superficial nature of these “incidental” friendships makes them “fake” and inauthentic. While they may look like friendships, they do not possess the characteristics of true friendship. We only characterize them as friendship to be able to get benefits (utility and pleasure) and because they seem to resemble a virtuous friendship. These relationships are “not really friendship at all” because they are not based on loving the person for their own sake. True friendship must actually involve mutual goodwill and a recognition of the other person’s intrinsic worth. Therefore, these friendships aren’t actually friendships but just relationships between people that bring joy and would want to be classified as friendships. They are mere deep fakes of friendships. 

Aristotle believed that friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure are “incidental” friendships because they depend on external circumstances that bring to the friends when they are together rather than an appreciation of the friend’s true self (virtue). In Book 8, Aristotle states that “Those who love because of utility love the other not for who the other is, but in so far as he is useful or pleasant” (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). Aristotle believes that these “incidental” friendships lack the depth and authenticity of what a virtuous friendship would have because they are motivated by self-interest of utility and pleasure rather than a genuine connection to one’s virtue (one’s self). Once the benefit (utility or pleasure) provided by the friend is no longer present, the friendship also ends; “When the cause of the friendship is removed, the friendship is dissolved too” (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). 

Unlike the “incidental” friendships of utility and pleasure, Aristotle believes that virtuous friendship is very “perfect.” In Book 8, Aristotle writes that the “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves” (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). In saying so, Aristotle believes that the perfect friendship (friendship of virtue) is enduring because it is based on an appreciation of the other person’s virtue rather than on external factors such as utility or pleasure. Virtuous and “perfect” friendships involve loving the other person for their own sake (oneself) which is the highest form of love that Aristotle states. This virtuous friendship’s love is tied to the other person’s moral character (or virtue) in which Aristotle believes reflects their true self. Therefore, he considers this virtuous friendship to be the “perfect” friendship because it includes all the essential qualities of genuine friendship.

However, there is a clear flaw in Aristotle’s concept of “perfect” and virtuous friendship as it is also very conditional in its own way. Aristotle believes that if one friend in the friendship ceases to be virtuous, the friendship will also end. In Book 8, he writes that “if one partner is far removed and becomes wicked, the friendship will also dissolve, since it is impossible for the one to continue to live the life that is proper to a friend” (Nicomachean Ethics, 8.3). This statement just clearly shows that virtuous friendships are not as unconditional as Aristotle suggests and seem to be as “incidental” as the other two types of friendships (pleasure and utility). It seems that friendship of virtue also hinges on to something in order for it to last: which is the continued moral excellence (in this case, virtue) of both individuals. Once a friend is not as virtuous as the other believes, then this friendship will end. But if a friendship depends on the other person’s virtue, then it may be the virtue itself—an abstract quality—rather than the person that becomes the true object of love. Because if it is real friendship, then a change of virtue should still keep the relationship last because it is not some quality of this friendship (virtue) that keeps it running, but the people in the friendship themselves. This undermines Aristotle’s claim that virtuous friendships are rooted in an appreciation of the individual for who they truly are because it seems that it is virtue itself that is what is being appreciated more. 

Even though in Book 2 Aristotle suggests that virtue is the essence of a person and that loving their virtue is equivalent to loving the person, there are some minor flaws in his statement. He argues that virtue reflects a person’s true self. He states that “The virtue of a man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well” (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.6). However, his reasoning is a bit flawed in the ever changing world. Equating a person’s identity entirely with their moral excellence (virtue) oversimplifies human nature. Humans are very complex beings shaped not only by their born virtues but also by their emotions, flaws, and unique experiences. These emotions, flaws, and unique experiences can change one’s virtues over time. No one holds the same virtue (a soul habit that allows a person to act well in life) throughout their entire life and there is deemed to be change. Just like this world is ever changing, nothing can always stay constant. No one’s habit (virtue) will always be consistent and it will definitely be affected by their experiences they encounter. If a friend is loved primarily for their virtue, then the love is not truly directed at the person as a whole. The love is directed to virtue. 

If the primary reason for the friendship bond is the other person’s virtue, then this type of friendship mirrors the transactional (benefit bound) nature of incidental friendships (the friendship of utility and the friendship of pleasure). Similar to loving someone for their utility or pleasure, the virtuous friend loves someone for something (their virtue) other than the person themself which is external compared to the individual itself. In this sense, Aristotle’s “perfect” friendship becomes very problematic because it also prioritizes the love for virtue (like utility and pleasure) over the person. Aristotle’s “perfect” friendship is not that “perfect” after all. 

Aristotle’s view fails to account for the resilience of friendships that endure despite changes in virtue. Real-life friendships should and often does persist through moral failings and transformations in virtues which should be what defines the friendship of virtue rather than the love for one’s virtue (it should be the love for one instead). Aristotle’s belief in which he equates the loss of virtue with the end of friendship makes a virtuous friendship the same as the other two types of “incidental” friendships.

While I agree with Aristotle’s categorization of friendships and his assertion that friendships of utility and pleasure are “incidental,” I disagree with his claim that only these two types fall into this category of incidental. To a degree, Aristotle’s characterization of virtuous friendship also makes it an incidental friendship because of its conditional nature of loving the virtue more than the person and the circumstances under which it would end (change of virtue). Aristotle’s argument that virtuous friendships will dissolve if one friend changes their virtue, as the bond is rooted in moral excellence of the person, is fallible. This conditionality places virtuous friendships on the same level as the other two types of friendships (being similarly dependent on external factors of pleasure and utility). 

If a friendship is contingent on the presence of virtue, then the love is not truly directed at the person but at their moral qualities (virtue). In this sense, virtuous friendship does not fully escape the limitations of incidental friendships. It seems that Aristotle’s ideal of virtuous friendship is not about loving the person for themselves but rather for the virtue they embody. This reduces the person to an abstract ideal of virtue and ignores the multifaceted, the ever evolving world, and of human’s virtue. True friendship of virtue should not depend solely on the other people’s virtue but should embrace the whole person which means including their imperfections, growth, and individuality. 

Citations 

Google. Google. http://www.google.com. Accessed 15 Dec. 2024.